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FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS ON THE USE OF COERCED
CONFESSIONS IN THE STATE COURTS
EDMOND L. COHIN
The admission in state courts of confessions
coerced by physical torture is dearly condemned
by the United States Supreme Court as violative
of the due process clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment to the Federal Constitution. This is so well
established in the law that when the court finds
that a confession was extorted by such means, it
is automatically voided, and the conviction re-
versed.2 As the Court said in Brown v. Mississippi:
"That complaint is not of the commission of mere
error, but of a wrong so fundamental, that it
made the whole proceeding a mere pretense of a
trial and rendered the conviction and sentence
wholly void."' There is, today, no'litigable issue
here.
The controversies of the past years have cen-
tered around confessions which were coerced by
psychological means.4 Since the 1940 case of
I Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278,286 (1936).
The due process clause requires "that state action
shall be consistent with the fundamental princples of
liberty and justice which lie at the base of all our civil
and political institutions." The use of a coerced con-
fession deprives the accused of life and liberty without
application of the fundamental principles of justice
intended in due process of law.
2 Stein v. New York, 346 U.S. 156, 182 (1952);
Haley v. Ohio, 324 U.S. 596 (1948).
3 See note 1, supra.
4 Note, 37 B. U. L. Rxv. 374, 375 (1957); Note, 8
W. REs. L.-REv. 538,539 (1957).
Chambers v. Florida, this form of coercion has
likewise been outlawed.
5
Unhappily, just what constitutes psychological
coercion is not clear,' as an analysis of the deci-
sions will show2 Throughout the years, numerous
5 309 U.S. 227 (1940).
6 Note, 37 B. U. L. Rxv. 374, 375 (1957).
7 Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227 (1940), was the
first state psychological confession case to reach the
Supreme Court. Chambers, an uneducated Negro, con-
fessed after being held incommunicado for eight days
and subjected to sustained questioning for a period of
five days and one night. Reversed. This was followed
by a series of per curia,, reversals, which all cited
Chambers: Canty v. Alabama, 309 U.S. 629 (1940);
Lomax v. Texas, 313 U.S. 544 (1941); Vernon v.
Alabama, 313 U.S. 547 (1941).
White v. Texas, 309 U.S. 631 (1940), was a case
that had elements of both psychological and physical
coercion. White, an illiterate farmhand was held incom-
municado for six days and periodically taken out in
deep woods by Texas Rangers for "questioning."
Reversed.
Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219 (1941), was the
first case to reach the Court wherein the conviction was
affirmed. The accused, an intelligent business man, was
questioned intermittently for several days. One slap
was established. He was held for three days without
arraignment.
Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143 (1943), intro-
duced the concept of "inherent coercion" based on
sustained relay questioning. The accused, a citizen of
good reputation, was held incommunicado for thirty-
six hours and continuously questioned by relays of
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guides for use in making this determination have
been advocated by various Justices of the Supreme
Court. Justice Douglas has long felt that any
confession obtained following a period of illegal
police officers. He had no sleep or rest, and a spotlight
was held on him constantly. Reversed.
Lyons v. Oklahoma, 322 U.S. 596 (1944), was the
first of several "consecutive confession" cases. A first
confession was admittedly coerced after eight hours of
continuous questioning, which included a display of the
victim's bones. Lyons confessed again twelve hours
later in the District Attorney's office. The latter con-
fession was admitted in evidence. Affirmed. The
opposite result was reached in Malinski v. New York,
324 U.S. 401 (1945). The accused was held incommuni-
cado for four days. During the first day he was stripped
and left naked for three hours, then given a blanket for
nine hours. At this point, he confessed. After three more
days of intermittent questioning, he confessed again,
and this confession was admitted in evidence. Gallegos
v. Nebraska, 342 U.S. 55 (1951), was a third case of this
type. Gallegos, an illiterate Mexican who could neither
speak nor write English, was held twenty-five days
without arraignment, and twenty-seven days without
a lawyer. He confessed the first time after four days of
intermittent questioning, no session lasting over two
hours. After the twenty-five days, he was taken before
a court for the first time, and confessed again. Affirmed.
See also: Leyra v. Denno, 347 U.S. 556 (1954). Stroble
v. California, 343 U.S. 181 (1952), also involved con-
secutive confessions, but here the first one was volun-
tary, and the second one was coerced. The first confes-
sion was admitted in evidence. Affirmed.
Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596 (1948), introduced a
series of cases that applied the "inherent coercion"
doctrine of Ashcraft. The accused, a fifteen year old
boy, was subjected to all night relay questioning, plus
confrontation with alleged confessions of cohorts. Re-
versed. See also: Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49 (1949),
(The accused was held incommunicado six days, much
of the time in solitary confinement. He was continu-
ously interrogated during this period by teams of
officers until well past midnight. Reversed.); Turner v.
Pennsylvania, 338 U.S. 62 (1949), (Accused subjected
to five days and nights of relay questioning while held
incommunicado. Reversed.); Harris v. South Carolina,
338 U.S. 68 (1949), (Harris, an illiterate Negro, con-
fessed after threats to arrest his mother plus relay
questioning for five days and nights. Reversed.).
Stein v. New York, 346 U.S. 156 (1952), introduced
a departure from the "inherent coercion" test of
Ashcraft. The Court looked not only at the coercive
practices alleged, but also weighed these against the
power of the accused to resist. The accused confessed
after two days of questioning and after hearing of the
confession of a cohort. 'More significantly, he bargained
for a "deal" before he confessed. Affirmed. This ap-
proach has been followed in the subsequent case of:
Fikes v. Alabama, 352 U.S. 191 (1957), (Illiterate
defendant was held incommunicado in a state prison
far from home and questioned intermittently for five
days. He finally confessed in response to leading ques-
tions. Reversed.); Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560
(1958), (The accused, an illiterate, nineteen year old
Negro, was held incommunicado for three days with
little food. He confessed after subtle threats by the
Chief of Police. Reversed.); Thomas v. Arizona, 356
U.S. 390 (1958), (The accused, of normal intelligence,
detention should be outlawed,' because "the
practice of obtaining confessions prior to arraign-
ment breeds the third-degree and the inquisition." 9
A majority of the Court has consistently refused
to adopt this rule, saying that illegal detention is
relevant only as bearing on the accused's claim
that he was coerced into confessing."
Justice Black has said that a confession obtained
after an accused was subjected to thirty-six hours
of questioning by continuous relay teams of
police officers was "inherently coercive," and there-
fore void."
Justices Black and Douglas, in the above in-
stances, spoke out for a strictly objective type of
test, as neither made any mention of the effect of
these practices upon the particular defendant
involved. Thus, it was not the veracity of the
confessions that was felt to violate due process,
but the practices employed in obtaining them,12
confessed in a court of law twenty hours after threats
of lynching. Affirmed-coercive effect had worn off).
The three most recent cases have all centered around
the absence of a lawyer for the accused during the
period of interrogation. In the first, Crooker v. Cali-
fornia, 357 U.S. 433 (1958), the accused had attended
a year of law school. He confessed after fourteen hours
during which his repeated requests for a lawyer were
denied. Affirmed. Cicenia v. La Gay, 357 U.S. 504
(1958), involved an accused who had retained a lawyer,
but claimed coercion since he was unable to confer with
him immediately before confessing. Affirmed. Cicenia
and Crooker were both murder suspects. In the case of
Spano v. New York, 27 U.S. L. WEEK 4483 (U.S. June
23, 1959), the accused was an ignorant twenty-five
year old Italian immigrant. He confessed to murder
after an all night session of sustained questioning follow-
ing his indictment for the crime. His repeated requests
for a lawyer were ignored. The majority reversed on
the ground that the confession was coerced, four
justices concurred in the reversal on the ground of
denial of legal counsel after indictment.
O See Justice Douglas' concurring opinion in Haley
v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596 (1948); and his opinions in
Crooker v. California, 357 U.S. 433 (1958); Stroble v.
California, 343 U.S. 181, 203 (1952); Harris v. South
Carolina, 338 U.S. 68, 71 (1949); Turner v. Pennsyl-
vania, 338 U.S. 62, 66 (1949); Watts v. Indiana, 338
U.S. 49, 56 (1949).
9 Stroble v. California, 343 U.S. 181, 203 (1952).
10 Stein v. New York, 346 U.S. 156, 187 (1952);
Stroble v. California, 343 U.S. 181, 197 (1952), citing
Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219, 234, 235, 240
(1941); Gallegos v. Nebraska, 342 U.S. 55, 59, 65
(1951); Lyons v. Oklahoma, 322 U.S. 596, 597, n.2
(1943).
11 Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143, 154 (1944):
"We think a situation such as that here shown by
uncontradicted evidence is so inherently coercive that
its very existence is irreconcilable with the possession
of mental freedom by a lone suspect against whom its
full coercive force is brought to bear."
12Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49, 55 (1949): "In
holding that the Due Process Clause bars police pro-
[Vol. so
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i.e., a censure of the police by the Court.13 The
objective test, then, as used in this comment,
means that any evidence of coercive practices
used in obtaining a confession will suffice to
void the conviction-with no consideration of the
effect of such practices upon the individual
involved.
The views of Justice Jackson represent the
opposite extreme, a subjective test: "The limits in
any case depend upon a weighing of the circum-
stances of pressure against the power of the
person confessing. What would be overpowering
to the weak of will or mind might be utterly
ineffective against an experienced criminal."'14
Justice Jackson, then, did not condemn police
practices, per se, but only when they combined to
overcome the power of a particular accused to
resist. He contended that the fourteenth amend-
ment does not enact a rigid exclusionary rule for
confessions based on compulsive practices. Rather,
in his view, it guarantees against a conviction
based on untrustworthy evidence.' 5 This represents
a very close approach to the state court tests of
simple trustworthiness-true or false. If the out-
side evidence shows that the confession is true, it
is admitted. 6
Which of these views, objective or subjective-
trustworthiness, represents the law of confessions
today?
The first case in which the Court considered the
problem was Chambers v. Florida,17 where a con-
fession was obtained after sustained questioning
of the accused for a period of five days, including
one all-night session. Justice Black, writing for a
unanimous Court, held that "the undisputed
facts showed that compulsion was applied."' It is
cedure which violates the basic notions of our accusi-
torial mode of prosecuting crime and vitiates a con-
viction based on the fruits of such procedure, we apply
the Due Process Clause to its historic function of
assuring appropriate procedure before liberty is cur-
tailed or life is taken." Also see Justice Roberts opinion
in Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219, 236 (1941):
"The aim of the requirement of due process is not to
exclude presumptively false evidence, but to prevent
fundamental unfairness in the use of evidence, whether
true or false."
13Inbau, The Confession Dilemma in the United
States Supreme Court, 43 ILL. L. REv. 442 (1948);
-Inbau, Restrictions in. the Law of Interrogation and
Confessions, 52 Nw. U. L. Rxv. 77 (1957).
14 Stein v. New York, 346 U.S. 156, 185 (1952).
-Id. at 192, 193.
1
6Note, 18 U. Prrr. L. REv. 823 (1957); Note, 8
W. REs. L. REv. 538 (1957).
1" 309 U.S. 227 (1940).
18 Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227, 239 (1940).
not clear from the opinion whether Justice Black
was using an objective or subjective test. As is
indicated above, he ostensibly based his decision on
the sole fact that there was evidence of compulsion
having been applied. This is dearly an objective
approach. Yet he was also well aware of the fact
that the accused was an "ignorant Negro."' 9 What
leads to the conclusion that the objective approach
was dominant in Justice Black's mind was the
fact that he vigorously condemned the inquisitorial
procedure followed, but said nothing of the effect
of this on the veracity of the confession.
20
The Court reversed several more convictions
in the next year, in per curiam opinions which
relied upon Chambers." Then the case of Lisenba
v. California came before the Court." In this case,
the accused was an intelligent, white business
man, and the Court affirmed the conviction in an
opinion written by Justice Roberts. Justices Black
and Douglas dissented. The facts here were similar
to those in Chambers in that the accused was sub-
jected to sustained questioning for some forty-two
hours and was held incommunicado for three days
before arraignment. There is little doubt that
this would have resulted in a reversal had a strict
objective test been applied. Thus, it would appear
that in concurring with Justice Black in the Cham-
bers case, most of the members of the Court placed
more emphasis than Justice Black on the fact
that an ignorant Negro was there involved. Since
the only distinguishing feature between Lisenba
and Chambers was the race and intelligence of
the accused, the majority of the Court in
Lisenba clearly used a subjective test-applying
the coercive facts alleged to the accused himself.
By dissenting, Justices Black and Douglas
clearly showed they were in favor of a strictly
objective test.
The next case decided by the Court, Ward v.
19 Id. at 238. Justice Black continually referred to
the accused as young, poor, ignorant, terrified, and the
like. Yet, he concluded that the circumstances were
calculated to "break the strongest nerves or the stoutest
resistance."
20 See, supra, note 18.
21 Ward v. Texas, 316 U.S. 547 (1942); Vernon v.
Alabama, 313 U.S. 541 (1941); Lomax v. Texas, 313
U.S. 544 (1941); White v. Texas, 309 U.S. 631 (1940);
Canty v. Alabama, 309 U.S. 629 (1940).
"314 U.S. 219 (1941).
23 Id. at 240: "The petitioner has said that the inter-
rogation would never have drawn an admission from
him had his confederate not made a statement;" at
241: "exhibited a self possession, a coolness, and an
acumen.. ." Such considerations would have been
immaterial had a strict objective test been followed.
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Texas, again involved an ignorant Negro and
further pointed out the increasing tendency of the
Court to consider the nature of the defendant.2
In this case, the accused was threatened and
questioned in three different jails on three different
days, far from his home. Writing for a unanimous
Court, Justice Byrnes, in reviewing the cases,
concluded that confessions had been set aside that
were "extorted from ignorant persons who have
been subjected to persistent and protracted
questioning, or who have been threatened with
mob violence, or who have been unlawfully held
incommunicado without advice of friends or
counsel, or who have been taken at night to
lonely and isolated places for questioning. Any
one of these grounds would be sufficient for
reversal." (Emphasis added) 25 By referring to
ignorant persons, a line was clearly drawn between
Lisenba and the balance of the cases. Where an
ignorant defendant was involved, the Court felt
that any one of the above enumerated practices
would require a reversal. If the defendant happens
to be reasonably intelligent then the Court, on
the strength of Lisenba, would balance the compul-
sion applied against the individual involved.
But then, in the famous case of Ashcraft v.
Tennessee,2 6 Justice Black again wrote the majority
opinion, and made it clear that he had never
waivered from his position of a strictly objective
test, regardless of the individual involved or his
intelligence. The accused, a white man of good
reputation in the community, confessed to murder
after thirty-six hours of continuous questioning by
teams of interrogators. Considering this fact
alone, Justice Black, speaking for the Court, held
that the practices used to obtain the confession
were "inherently coercive" and reversed the
conviction.n
This "inherently coercive" doctrine was the
objective test in full flower-the first case where
it was dearly applied. Oddly enough, this case
also saw the birth of the subjective test as we
know it today. Up to this point, with the exception
of a brief flame in Lisenba, it had been developed
only by implication-from the continued emphasis
of the Court on the race and intelligence of the
defendant. But here, Justice Jackson, in a strong
dissent in which Justices Roberts and Frankfurter
joined, urged the Court to apply the facts to the
24 316 U.S. 547 (1942).
25 Id. at 555.
26 322 U.S. 143 (1943,.
27 Id. at 154.
individual in order "to determine whether the
confessor was in possession of his own will and
self-control at the time of confession."'8 In this
opinion, Justice Jackson keynoted the position he
was to take for the rest of his time on the bench.'
Up to this point, Ashwraft was the only case
where it can be unquestionably said that the ob-
jective test was applied, since an intelligent white
man of good reputatiout was involved. It will be
recalled that while Justice Black wrote for a
unanimous Court in Chambers, it subsequently
developed that all the Justices, except for himself
and Justice Douglas, made it apparent that they
gave no small weight to the fact that ignorant
Negroes were there involved. The Ashwraft case is
doubly significant, then, both for its holding, based
on a dearly objective test, and its dissent, calling
for the subjective test.
The Ashcraft case left the states in a considerable
dilemma' 0 As Justice Jackson pointed out in his
dissent: "If thirty-six hours [of continuous in-
terrogation] is more than is permissible, what
about 24? or 12? or 6? or 1? All are 'inherently
coercive.' "31 In short, there is no doubt that many
cases where there are no clues would remain un-
solved if there was no interrogation--and sus-
tained interrogation at that." The Ashcraft case
left the police with absolutely no idea of how much
interrogation of the accused was permissible prior
to the trial. As Justice Jackson himself asked, at
what point does interrogation become "inherently
coercive"? A retreat was clearly necessary to give
the courts a rule that was more practical and easily
administered.n
Yet, rather than retreat, the Court further con-
fused the issue in an era marked by several in-
conclusive opinions.31 The most significant feature
2s Id. at 162.
29 See Justice Jackson's opinions in Watts v. Indiana,
338 U.S. 49, 59 (1949); and Stein v. New York, 346
U.S. 156 (1952).
20Inbau, The Confession Dilemma in the United
States Supreme Court, 43 ILL. L. REv. 442, 444 (1948).
21 Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143, 162 (1943).
Inbau, supra, note 30, at 448.
3Id. at 463.
4Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596 (1948) (All night relay
questioning of a fifteen year old boy plus confrontation
with the alleged confessions of cohorts. Reversed). This
case was followed, in the next year, by three cases de-
cided the same day, and all resulting in reversals. The
opinions were written by Justice Frankfurter. Watts v.
Indiana, 338 U.S. 49 (1949) (The accused was held
incommunicado six days, much of the time in solitary
confinement. During this time he was continuously
interrogated by teams of officers until well past mid-
night.); Turner v. Pennsylvania, 338 U.S. 62 (1949)
[Vol. so
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of this group of cases was the marked shift by
Justice Frankfurter. It will be recalled he joined
with Justice Jackson in dissenting from the ob-
jective test of Ashcraft. However, he wrote the
opinion in three of the four cases referred to above,
wherein the convictions were reversed. In each, the
key element of compulsion was 5 or more days of
relay questioning, 5 though each accused was a
Negro, as opposed to white as in AshcraJt. Justice
Frankfurter did an about face and spoke in terms
of the "inherent compulsion" of Ashcrafl: "A con-
fession by which life becomes forfeit must be the
product of free choice.... But if it is the product of
sustained pressure from the police, it does not issue
from a free choice. When a suspect speaks because
he is overborne, it is immaterial whether he has
been subjected to a physical or a mental tor-
ture.... The very relentlessness of such! interroga-
tion implies that it is better for the prisoner to
answer than to persist in the refusal of disclosure
which is his constitutional right."36 Thus Justice
Frankfurter seemed to reverse completely his
former opinion, saying nothing with respect to the
actual effect of the questioning upon the defend-
ants. He thus placed his stamp of approval on the
Ashcrafi doctrine.
Accordingly, the dilemma of Ashcraff not only
remained, it was reinforced. And still another
problem came up during this period-the problem
of consecutive confessions. The states began the
practice of extracting confessions by admittedly
coercive means, getting the accused to repeat the
confession at a later time, and then admitting only
(The accused was subjected to five days and nights of
relay questioning while being held incommunicado.);
Harris v. South Carolina, 338 U.S. 68 (1949) (An
illiterate Negro was subjected to questioning for five
days and nights, and threatened with arrest of his
mother.) Only the Haley case had an opinion in which
four Justices concurred. In the other three only Jus-
tices Rutledge and Murphy joined with Justice Frank-
furter.
The convictions were affirmed in both Gallegos v.
Nebraska, 342 U.S. 55 (1951) and Stroble v. California,
343 U.S. 181 (1952), but it is difficult to say just what
test was applied. In Stroble, the accused conf ssed just
four hours after apprehension, and in Gallegos, he con-
fessed before he was even told why he had been appre-
hended. Upon these facts, the convictions could be
affirmed under either the objective or subjective tests,
but in Comment, 32 TEx. L. R. 429, 434-436 (1954),
the author thought that these two cases ushered in the
subjective test.
31 Watt v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49 (1949); Turner v.
Pennsylvania, 338 U.S. 62 (1949); Harris v. South
Carolina, 338 U.S. 68 (1949).
36 Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49, 53-54 (1949).
the second confession into evidence. The Court
dealt with this problem on the basis of "the con-
tinuing effect of the coercive practices which may
fairly.be drawn from the surrounding circum-
stances.""'
In Lyons v. Oklahoma, the second confession
occurred twelve hours after the first, and in a new
locale, the accused having been taken from the
coercive atmosphere of the jail to the District
Attorney's office." The Court held that the co-
ercive influence of the first confession had worn
off, and that the subsequent confession was vol-
untary.
In two later cases, Malinski v. New York, 40 and
Leyra v. Denno,4 the Court reversed convictions
based on essentially the same facts. The basis of
distinction was that in the latter cases, the de-
fendants had been retained in the jail after the
first confession and questioned for several more
days before they again confessed. Those were
cases where the Court said the coercive effect of
the first confession continued up to the time of the
second one. This is a much easier position to under-
stand because as Justice Rutledge pointed out in
his opinion in the Malinski case, everything the
accused does after he confesses the first time is
colored by that confession * If he reaffirms it, it
is with the idea that they have the first one any-
way, and if he denies it, he knows that the state
can use the first one to impeach him.
Therefore, it is extremely difficult to really de-
termine when the coercive effect of the first con-
fession wears off-beyond a bald guess. Yet, policy-
wise, it would not do to invalidate a confession for
no other reason than that a prior one was coerced.
The best way out of this problem seems to be to
adopt the suggestion of Justice Murphy that, if
the first confession was coerced, "Subsequent con-
fessions should automatically be invalidated un-
less there is proof beyond all reasonable doubt
that such an atmosphere has been dispelled and
the accused has completely regained his free in-
dividual will."
Thus, the seven year period between 1945 and
1952 saw the states confronted with the Ashcraft
7Leyra v. Denno, 347 U.S. 556 (1954); Malinski v.
New York, 324 U.S. 401 (1945); Lyons v. Oklahoma,
322 U.S. 596 (1944).
18 Lyons v. Oklahoma, 322 U.S. 596, 602 (1944).
39 322 U.S. 596 (1944).
40 324 U.S. 401 (1945). -
41 347 U.S. 556 (1954).
42 Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401, 428 (1945).43Id. at 433.
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dilemma, and a series of opinions which did nothing
to resolve it.
The first case in which the majority of the Court,
speaking through Justice Jackson, faced the issue
squarely was Stein v. New York, which ushered in
the subjective test for which Justice Jackson had
been crusading.44
This case involved the confessions of two de-
fendants accused of felony murder. The confessions
were obtained after twelve hours of intermittent
questioning over a thirty-two hour period of in-
communicado detention. These men were hardened
criminals, each with a lengthy police record.
45
One, Cooper, confessed only after bargaining with
the District Attorney, who agreed not to appre-
hend Cooper's brother, a parole violator.
The twelve hours of questioning was thought by
Justice Frankfurter, dissenting, to bring the case
within the Ashcrajt doctrine: "not the candor of a
guilty conscience, the need of an accused to un-
burden himself, but the means of release from the
tightening of the psychological police screws.1
46
Justice Frankfurter thus went fully about from
his position in Aslwraft, where he dissented with
Justice Jackson, aligning himself with Justices
Douglas and Black, who, since Chambers,4 had
never waivered in their belief in the objective test.
Justice Jackson, writing for the majority, while
not referring to, or overruling Ashcrajt, certainly
modified it. He first admitted that: "a process of
interrogation can be so prolonged and unremitting,
especially when accompanied by deprivation of
refreshment, rest or relief, as to accomplish extrac-
tion of an involuntary confession. '48 Having thus
acknowledged Ashcraft, he then pointed out the
need for interrogation: "Interrogation is not
inherently coercive, as is physical violence. In-
terrogation does have social value in solving a
crime, as physical force does not.... Indeed, in-
terrogation of those who know something about
the facts is the chief means to solution of crime."
(emphasis added)4 9 Since this case dealt with
hardened criminals who were not really subjected
44 346 U.S. 156 (1952). See Justice Jackson's dissent
in Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143, 162 (1943).
Also see his opinion in Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49,
57 (1949), wherein he affirms the Watts decision and
dissents from the holdings of Turner v. Pennsylvania,
338 U.S. 62 (1949) and Harris v. South Carolina, 338
U.S. 68 (1949).
41 Stein v. New York, 346 U.S. 156, 176 (1952).
46 Id. at 200.
17 See, supra, note 8.
48 Stein v. New York, 346 U.S. 156, 184 (1952).
49 Ibid.
to sustained relay questioning of the nature of
Ashcraft, this is dictum rather than holding, but
it clearly indicates a retreat from the "inherently
coercive" doctrine of Ashcraft.
Justice Jackson then proceeded to re-evaluate
the importance of sustained questioning as an
element of coercion. Rather than requiring an
automatic reversal as in Ashcraft, "The limits in
any case depend upon a weighing of the circum-
stances of pressure against the power of resistance
of the person confessing" 50
Another way of looking at the test as expressed
in Stein is to inquire as to when a confession is
voluntary, rather than when is it coerced. And,
as Justice Jackson said, confessions are considered
voluntary whenever the confessors apparently
were "convinced that their dance was over and
the time had come to pay the fiddler."5' No con-
fession can ever be more voluntary than that, un-
less you want to compare a voluntary confession
to a confession made to a priest or lawyer.52
In adopting the subjective test, Justice Jackson
advanced an entirely new philosophy for the ex-
clusion of coerced confessions. He stated that the
fourteenth amendment does not enact a rigid ex-
clusionary rule for confessions based on compulsive
practices-rather it guarantees against a convic-
tion based on untrustworthy evidence." Justice
Jackson recognized the need for interrogation by
police, but condemned coercion which led to a
confession against the will of the individual and
which was so strong as to make the confession pre-
sumptively untrue.5
This is the opposite of the rationale of the ob-
jective test, as Justice Douglas recalls in his dis-
sent,55 where he claimed that the Court is not con-
cerned with the innocence of the accused, but
rather with whether his constitutional rights have
been protected.5 6
Yet, the test of Stein can, by no means, be
equated with the strict subjective-trustworthiness
50 Id. at 185.
51 Id. at 186.
52 Ibid.
5Id. at 192, 193.
4 Id. Justice Jackson at 192: "Coerced confessions
are not more stained with illegality than other evidence
obtained in violation of law. But reliance on a coerced
confession vitiates a conviction because such a con-
fession combines the persuasiveness of apparent con-
clusiveness with what judicial experience shows to be
illusory and deceptive evidence."
-5 Id. at 203, Justice Douglas' dissent.
56 See, supra, note 12.
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test of the states.7 Rather than looking at the facts
involved and then deciding if the amount of com-
pulsion indicated the confession was probably un-
true, the Court looks at the facts and determines
if the accused was coerced into confessing against
his will-thus the only real difference between
Justices Jackson and Douglas is that Justice
,Douglas will just look at the facts to see if there
was coercion, whereas Justice Jackson will look at
the facts and apply them to the individual.
There is an even more significant difference be-
tween a simple truthfulness test and the subjec-
tive test. If truthfulness were the sole criterion, it
would follow that the Supreme Court would auto-
matically affirm a conviction if the available evi-
dence aside from the confession supported it-a
thing they do not do.5s
Following Stein, then, there were three different
tests-the objective test of Ashcraft, the sub-
jective-truthfulness test of the states, and now, the
Stein test; applying the amount of coercion alleged
to the individual.
From this point onward, the Stein test has held
sway. It was soon afterwards applied in Fikes v.
Alabama, wherein a murder conviction was re-
versed by the Court.59 Quoting the test as it first
V Note, 18 U. PiTT. L. REv. 823 (1953); Note,
8 W. REs. L. REv. 538 (1957).
63 If the Court finds, from the undisputed facts, that
the confession was coerced, they reverse: Thomas v.
Arizona. 356 U.S. 390, 397 (1958); Haley v. Ohio, 332
U.S. 596, 598 (1948); Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S.
401, 404 (1945); Lyons v. Oklahoma, 322 U.S. 596,
601 (1944); Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143, 147,
148 (1943); Gallegos v. Nebraska, 342 U.S. 55, 61
(1951); Ward v. Texas, 316 U.S. 547, 550 (1942);
Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219, 237 (1941);
Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227, 228 (1940).
When testimony in the lower court as to coercion is
conflicting, the Court accepts the findings of the triers
of fact: Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49 (1949); Ward v.
Texas, 316 U.S. 547, 552 (1942); Lisenba v. California,
314 U.S. 219, 238 (1941).
This is true regardless of the amount of outside
evidence available to sustain the conviction: Stroble v.
California, 343 U.S. 181, 190 (1952); Gallegos v.
Nebraska, 342 U.S. 55, 63 (1951); Haley v. Ohio, 332
U.S. 596, 599 (1948); Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S.
401, 404, 410 (1945); Lyons v. Oklahoma, 322 U.S.
596, 597 (1944); Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 327 U.S. 274,
279 n.1 (1943); Ward v. Texas, 316 U.S. 547, 549
.(1942).
In Stein v. New York, 346 U.S. 156, 192 (1952),
Justice Jackson tried to modify this rule by stating
that when the issue of coercion was initially given to
the jury, and they voted for conviction after finding
the confession coerced, then the Supreme Court would
affirm on the outside evidence. This is dicta, as the con-
fession was held voluntary in Stein, and, further, it was
later rejected in Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560
(1958).
59 352 U.S. 191 (1957).
appeared in Stein, the Court contrasted the hard-
ened criminals of that case with Fikes, an ignorant
Negro, and concluded that his power to resist was
definitely overcome by the coercive pressures ap-
plied.60 Fikes was held incommunicado in a state
prison far from his home, and confessed after being.
questioned intermittently for five days.
Justice Frankfurter wrote a concurring opinion
in which he remarked that the totality of cir-
cumstances brought the result below "the Plimisoll
line of 'due process.' "6 Though the Stein test was
dearly applied,n Justice Frankfurter, by writing a
separate opinion indicated that he, at least, had
not abandoned the objective test.
The Stein test was also applied in Thomas v.
Arizona,n where the conviction was affirmed, and
in Payne v. Arkansas,8 ' which resulted in a re-
versal. Payne involved an illiterate nineteen year
old Negro who was held incommunicado for three
days with little food and was subjected to subtle
threats by the chief of police. The Court talked of
"the totality of this course of conduct", and com-
mented that it did not constitute "an expression
of free choice." 5 Thomas was a man of normal
intelligence who confessed in a court of law twenty
hours after a lynching threat. The Court felt that
the coercive effect of this threat had worn off.6"
Croaker v. Califoruia and Cicenia v. La Gay1
were both cases where the defendants claimed co-
ercion solely on the grounds that they did not get
to see a lawyer before they confessed. The Court
affirmed both convictions because Crooker had had
a year of law school and therefore knew his
rights and Cicenia had hired a lawyer and spoken
to him prior to his confession. No coercion of these
two men was found from the fact that no lawyer
60 It is interesting to note that Justice Warren,
while quoting Justice Jackson's Stein test with approval
in Fikes v. Alabama, 352 U.S. 191, 197 (1957), says
that this is the same test that was applied in Watts. It
is submitted that this is error, as Watts followed the
objective test of Ashcraft. In Watts, Justice Frankfurter
said if a confession is "the product of sustained pressure
from the police, it does not issue from a free choice."
Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49, 54 (1949). This is clearly
the "inherently coercive" language of Ashcraft.
61 Fikes v. Alabama, 352 U.S. 191, 199 (1957).
12 Id. at 193. Chief Justice Warren: "It is, of course,
highly material to the question before this Court to
ascertain petitioner's character and background."
13 356 U.S. 390 (1958).
64356 U.S. 560 (1958).
85 Id. at 567.
66 322 U.S. 596 (1944); Malinski v. New York, 324
U.S. 401 (1945). Also see: Lyons v. Oklahoma, 322
U.S. 596 (1944).
67 357 U.S. 433 (1958).
£8357 U.S. 504 (1958)_
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was present. Though they did have a legal right
to counsel at pre-trial proceedings, 9 at the time
of these investigations the accused were merely
suspects and had not been indicted.
In the most recent case to reach the Supreme
Court, Spano v. New York,70 Chief Justice Warren
clearly continued the subjective test of Stein. This
case involved a twenty-five year old Italian im-
migrant who had had only one half year of high
school and also had a record of emotional in-
stability. He was indicted for murder and sub-
sequently surrendered. He was then subjected to an
all-night questioning session in which fifteen in-
terrogators participated. He finally "confessed"
after one of these men, a life long friend, made an
impassioned plea. The friend claimed that he and
his family would be in serious trouble and that his
position as a rookie policeman would be jeopard-
ized if the accused did not confess. The accused
made repeated requests during the night to see his
lawyer. They were denied.
After a discussion of the above facts, Chief
Justice Warren concluded that: "Petitioner's
will was overborn by official pressure, fatigue and
sympathy falsely aroused, after considering all the
facts in their post indictment setting.''
This case is dearly distinguishable from both
Crooker and Cicenia in that not only was the ac-
cused much more untutored, but also he was sub-
jected to a great deal more pressure. Further, both
Crooker and Cicenia were only suspects at the
time of their interrogations. Spano had already
been indicted and thus unquestionably had an
absolute right to counsel at every step of the in-
vestigation. 2
Crooker and Cicenia simply held that a lawyer
need not be present at all pre-indictment pro-
ceedings.
All other considerations aside, there is a sound
practical basis for affirming these pre-indictment
"lawyer" cases. Otherwise, any confession ob-
tained out of the presence of a lawyer could easily
be held coercive per se. The effect of this on legiti-
mate police practice is so obvious as to require no
comment.
This policy consideration portends a virtual
abandonment of the objective test in the very
69 Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932).70 Spano v. New York, 27 U.S. L. WFEK 4483 (U.S.
June 23, 1959).
71 Id. at 4485.
72 Id. at 4486, concurring opinions of Justices Doug-
las, Black, Stewart and Brenhan. Also See: Powell v.
Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
near future, if Stein and the subsequent cases have
not already done so. It will be recalled that the
original reason for overturning a coerced con-
fession was a blanket condemnation of the police
methods used.73 Yet, the very number of cases
arising was a powerful indication that the police
were oblivious to this censure-they had gotten
their confession and closed the books. By the time
the Supreme Court decision came down, the case
was out of sight and out of mind.
What of these police practices? It has already
been mentioned that interrogation over a period
of time is a necessary and perhaps the only method
of solving crimes where there are no other clues."
And, as Justice Jackson pointedly asked: "Is it
his [defendant's] right to have the judgement on
the facts? Or is it his right to have a judgement
based on only such evidence as he cannot conceal
from the authorities, who cannot compel him to
testify in court and also cannot question him be-
fore?'n'
Against this must be balanced the fact that
abuse does exist in the coercive techniques em-
ployed by the police, or so many cases would not
reach the Supreme Court. While this does give
strength to the basis of the objective test, where a
confession was voided at once when evidence of
this practice was present, it has already been seen
that this has little appreciable effect as a de-
terrent. A more direct approach to this problem-
increased supervision of the police by the various
states, to attack the problem at the source--is a
far more satisfactory solution. 6
Thus the law as it has evolved, and as policy
clearly dictates, involves a close examination by
the Court of the alleged compulsive facts, balanced
against the power of the defendant to resist-the
Stein test.
What does the Stein test do to the dilemma posed
by Ashcraft? Justice Black in'Ashcrajt enunciated
the doctrine of "inherent coercion" from sustained
interrogation, leaving the states with no workable
rule-no yardstick of just what they could do to
secure a confession. Today there is no clear cut
yardstick either, but at least we know that what-
ever practices are engaged in by the police, as
long as they are not physical, a resultant con-
73 See, supra, note 12; 37 B. U. L. REv. 374, 375
(1957).
74 Stein v. New York, 346 U.S. 156 (1952). Inbau,
supra, note 30, at 448.
76 Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49, 59 (1949).
76 Inbau, supra, note 13.
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